



Hafer v. Melo, 
_U.S._, 91 D.A.R. 13658, 
No. 90-681 (Nov. 5, 1991). 
Section 1983 Violations 
by State Officials Can Subject Them 
to Suit as Individuals 
In this proceeding, the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled 8-0 that state officials sued 
in their individual capacities for civil 
rights violations are "persons" for pur-
poses of 42 U.S.C. section 1983, which 
expressly creates a cause of action for 
improper deprivation of civil rights by 
"every person" acting "under color of 
any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or 
the District of Columbia." The Court ex-
pressly eliminated the ambiguity arising 
from its 1989 decision in Will v. Michi-
gan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 
58, which held that state officials "acting 
in their official capacities" are outside 
the class of "persons" subject to liability 
under section 1983. (See CRLR Vol. 9, 
No. 3 (Summer 1989) p. 130 for back-
ground information on Will.) 
The Court noted that personal-capac-
ity suits seek to impose individual liabil-
ity upon a government officer for actions 
taken under color of state law. According 
to the Court, "officers sued in their per-
sonal capacity come to court as individu-
als. A government official in the role of 
personal-capacity defendant thus fits 
comfortably within the statutory term 
'person."' The Court rejected Hafer's ar-
gument that section 1983 liability turns 
not on the capacity in which state offi-
cials are sued, but on the capacity in 
which they acted when injuring the plain-
tiff. The Court noted that her theory 
"would absolutely immunize state offi-
cials from personal liability for acts within 
their authority and necessary to fulfilling 
governmental responsibilities" and held 
that "[s]tate executive officials are not 
entitled to absolute immunity for their 
official actions." Thus, the Court con-
cluded that state officers are not abso-
lutely immune from personal liability 
under section 1983 solely by virtue of 
the "official" nature of their acts. 
LITIGATION 
NINTH CIRCUIT COURT 
OF APPEALS 
Corder v. Gates, 
947 F.2d 374, 91 D.A.R. 12676, 
Nos. 88-5555, 88-5588 (Oct. 16, 1991 ). 
Trial Court Improperly Reduced 
Attorneys' Fee Award 
The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has determined that the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of 
California erred when it reduced the 
amount of attorneys' fees awarded to 
civil rights plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. 
section 1988; that statute authorizes 
courts to award reasonable attorneys' fees 
to prevailing parties in civil rights litiga-
tion. In the underlying action, plaintiffs 
brought suit against over 50 defendants, 
alleging that they illegally detained them 
and conducted an improper search of 
their residence in a misguided attempt to 
find an escaped prisoner. Prior to trial, 
plaintiffs rejected a $45,000 settlement 
offer; that offer included $39,000 worth 
of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees that had ac-
crued and would have left plaintiffs with 
$6,000. Following trial, a jury awarded 
plaintiffs a total of $24,006 in compen-
satory and punitive damages against only 
three of the defendants; the district court 
subsequently awarded plaintiffs $90,333 
in attorneys' fees, after discounting the 
full "lodestar" amount by 20% to reflect 
plaintiffs' limited success against the de-
fendants. Plaintiffs appealed the district 
court's award of attorneys' fees, arguing 
that the court erred when it adjusted the 
fee award downward to reflect limited 
success. 
Although acknowledging that district 
courts have considerable discretion in 
determining attorneys' fees, the Ninth 
Circuit determined that the district court's 
20% reduction of the full amount was 
based on clearly erroneous reasoning. 
When reducing the attorneys' fee award 
for limited success, the district court cited 
plaintiffs' rejection of the settlement of-
fer, stating that the result of plaintiffs' 
decision to proceed to trial "was to win 
a much smaller figure than they could 
have obtained much earlier by simply 
accepting defendants' offer." In reject-
ing the district court's holding, the Ninth 
Circuit recognized that plaintiffs gained 
over $18,000 by litigating their case to 
its conclusion. The Ninth Circuit re-
manded the matter to district court "with 
another opportunity to consider whether 
an adjustment to the lodestar amount is 
appropriate." 
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 
Legislature v. Eu, 
_Cal. 3d_, 91 D.A.R. 12510, 
No. S0l9660 (Oct. 10, 1991). 
Legislative Term Limits of 
Proposition 140 Are Constitutional 
In this proceeding, the California Su-
preme Court determined that Proposi-
tion 140, the "Political Reform Act of 
1990" enacted at the November 1990 
general election, is constitutionally valid 
in all respects other than its proposed 
restrictions on the pensions of incum-
bent lawmakers. The stated purpose of 
Proposition 140 is to "restore a free and 
democratic system of fair elections, and 
to encourage qualified candidates to seek 
public office" by limiting "the powers of 
incumbency." The initiative measure 
sought to accomplish these goals by re-
stricting retirement benefits, limiting 
state-financed incumbent staff and sup-
port services, and placing limits upon the 
number of terms which may be served. 
As a preliminary matter, the court con-
sidered whether Proposition 140 imposes 
a "lifetime ban" on officers who have 
served the specified number of terms, or 
merely limits the number of consecutive 
terms they may serve. The court noted 
that the introduction to Proposition 140 
refers to curtailing "[t]he ability of legis-
lators to serve unlimited ... terms," by 
limiting "the numberofterms which may 
be served." Further, the court noted that 
the measure repeatedly announced its in-
tent to eliminate "career politicians," and 
held that such language supports the view 
that a lifetime ban was intended. The 
court also reviewed the analysis and ar-
guments in the official ballot pamphlets 
to determine the voters' intent regarding 
this matter. The court gave significant 
weight to the fact that the opponents' 
ballot arguments against Proposition 140 
forcefully and repeatedly stressed the 
measure's "lifetime ban," noting that the 
proponents failed to contradict the "life-
time ban" contention in their ballot argu-
ment. The court thus concluded that 
Proposition 140's term limitations ex-
tend over the lifetime of each affected 
officeholder. 
The court then considered whether 
the measure effected a constitutional re-
vision-which may be accomplished 
only by convening a constitutional con-
vention and obtaining popular ratifica-
tion, or by legislative submission of the 
measure to the voters-rather than a mere 
amendment, which may be accomplished 
by citizens' initiative. According to the 
court, to find a revision, it must necessar-
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ily or inevitably appear from the face of 
the challenged provision that the mea-
sure will substantially alterthe basic gov-
ernmental framework set forth in the state 
constitution. ·'Proposition 140 on its face 
does not affect either the structure or the 
foundational powers of the Legislature. 
which remains free to enact whatever 
laws it deems appropriate. The challenged 
measure alters neither the contents of 
those laws nor the process by which they 
are adopted. No legislative power is di-
minished or delegated to other persons 
or agencies." The court held that peti-
tioners' claims of momentous, detrimen-
tal consequences to the state's govern-
mental scheme are "largely speculative,'' 
and added that ·'respondents argue with 
equal conviction that Proposition l 40's 
term limitations will free the entire pro-
cess from the control of assertedly en-
trenched, apathetic. veteran incumbents. 
thereby allowing fresh creative energies 
to flourish free of vested, self-serving 
legislative interests.'' In finding that noth-
ing on the face of Proposition 140 effects 
a constitutional revision, the court also 
stated that "[t]o hold that reform mea-
sures such as Proposition 140, which are 
directed at reforming the Legislature it-
self. can be initiated only with the 
Legislature's own consent and approval, 
could eliminate the only practical means 
the people possess to achieve reform of 
that branch." 
The court next addressed petitioners' 
claim that Proposition 140 violates the 
constitutional single-subject rule by com-
bining in a single measure such "dispar-
ate" subjects as term and budgetary limi-
tations and pension restrictions. 
According to the court, an initiative mea-
sure does not violate the single-subject 
requirement if, despite its varied collat-
eral effects, all of its parts are "reason-
ably germane" to each other. and to the 
general purpose or object of the initia-
tive. The court found that the unifying 
theme or common purpose of Proposi-
tion 140 is "incumbency reform," and 
held that the various provisions of the 
measure are reasonably germane to that 
subject. 
The court then considered petition-
ers' contention that the term limitations 
of Proposition 140 violate the first and 
fourteenth amendments of the federal 
constitution by substantially burdening 
two fundamental rights: the right to vote 
and the right to be a candidate for public 
office. The court determined that three 
separate elements must be considered in 
ascertaining the constitutionality of state 
laws restricting access to the ballot: (I) 
the nature of the injury to the rights af-
fected; (2) the interests asserted by the 
state as justifications for that injury; and 
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(3) the necessity for imposing the par-
ticular burden affecting the plaintiff's 
rights, rather than some less drastic alter-
natives. The court acknowledged that 
Proposition 140 affects the rights of vot-
ers and candidates, but noted several miti-
gating factors. including the voters' con-
tinued right to vote for any qualified 
candidates and the candidates' ability to 
run for other public offices. As to the 
second element. the court stated that 
"[t]he universal authority is that restric-
tion upon the succession of incumbents 
serves a rational public policy and that. 
while restrictions may deny qualified men 
an opportunity to serve. as a general rule 
the overall health of the body politic is 
enhanced by limitations on continuous 
tenure." Regarding the third element, the 
court determined that. realistically, "only 
a lifetime ban could protect against vari-
ous kinds of continued exploitation of 
the 'advantages of incumbency' captured 
through past terms in office." The court 
thus concluded that "the interests of the 
state in incumbency reform outweigh any 
injury to incumbent office holders and 
those who would vote for them" and that 
"the legitimate and compelling interests 
set forth in the measure outweigh the 
narrower interests of petitioner legisla-
tors and the constituents who wish to 
perpetuate their incumbency.'' 
The court then addressed petitioners· 
assertion that Proposition 140 is. in ef-
fect, an unlawful bill of attainder, de-
fined as a "legislative punishment of any 
form or severity, of specifically desig-
nated persons or groups." The court stated 
that broad reform measures are frequently 
prompted by particular acts or circum-
stances involving specific individuals, but 
such measures would not constitute im-
proper bills of attainder unless an intent 
to punish such individuals clearly ap-
pears from their face, or from the cir-
cumstances surrounding their passage. 
Although acknowledging that the 
measure's proponents sought to limit the 
terms of incumbent legislators such as 
Assembly Speaker Willie Brown (who 
has been in office since 1964) and Senate 
President pro Tempore David Roberti 
(who has been in office since 1971 ), the 
court pointed out that "Proposition 140 
applies with equal force to all state legis-
lators, current and future" and concluded 
that Proposition 140 does not constitute 
a bill of attainder. 
Finally, the court considered petition-
ers' claim that Proposition 140's limita-
tions on the pension rights of incumbent 
legislators are unconstitutional as an in-
valid impairment of contract under the 
federal constitution. The court agreed 
with petitioners that provisions of Propo-
sition 140 terminate the pension system 
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entirely as to additional benefits accru-
ing for future services: the court also 
agreed with petitioners that incumbent 
legislators have a vested right to earn 
additional pension benefits through con-
tinued service. The court thus concluded 
that the pension restrictions of Proposi-
tion 140 are unconstitutional under the 
federal contracts clause as applied to in-
cumbent legislators because they infringe 
on the vested pension rights of those 
persons. However, the court also found 
that nonincumbent legislators first as-
suming office after Proposition 140 be-
came effective acquired no vested or 
protectible right to a continuation of the 
pension system in operation prior to their 
employment and upheld the provisions 
as applied to them. Finally. the court 
found that "[a]lthough a portion of Propo-
sition 140 is invalid as applied to incum-
bent legislators, Its invalidity does not 
affect the remaining provisions of the 
measure. for those provisions can be 
given effect without regard to the valid-
ity or operation of the invalid pension 
restrictions." 
Wilson v. Eu, 
_Cal. 3d_, 91 D.A.R. 13082 
No. S022835 (Oct. 23, 1991 ). 
Supreme Court Takes Over 
Redistrict111g Task 
On September 25, following Gover-
nor Wilson's veto of three plans contain-
mg new districts drawn by the Demo-
crat-controlled legislature. the California 
Supreme Court exercised its original ju-
risdiction by ordering issuance of an al-
ternative writ of mandate contemplating 
the drafting and adoption by the court of 
reapportionment plans for the state's leg-
islative, congressional, and Board of 
Equalization districts (Wilson v. Eu, 54 
Cal. 3d 471 ( 1991) (Wilson/)). The court 
appointed the Honorable George A. 
Brown, retired Associate Justice of the 
Fifth District Court of Appeal, the Hon-
orable Rafael H. Galceran, retired Judge 
of the Los Angeles County Superior 
Court. and the Honorable Thomas 
Kongsgaard, retired Judge of the Napa 
County Superior Court, as Special Mas-
ters on Reapportionment. In Wilson /, 
the court also directed the Masters to 
commence public hearings within thirty 
days of their appointment, and to present 
their recommendations to the court no 
later than November 29; the court also 
called for a thirty-day period of briefing 
and public comment following the filing 
of the Masters' recommendations prior 




In this proceeding, the court consid-
ered proposals submitted by Secretary of 
State March Fong Eu for implementing 
reapportionment plans at a time and in a 
manner which would avoid postponing 
or bifurcating the June 2 primary elec-
tion. Specifically, the court agreed with 
the Secretary's recommendations that (I) 
the court make the Masters' recom-
mended plans available to county elec-
tion officials as soon as available "in a 
computer-readable electronic medium 
with supporting maps and hard copy"; 
(2) the Secretary of State submit the rec-
ommended plans to the U.S. Department 
of Justice "on an informational basis" for 
eventual preclearance under the Voting 
Rights Act, immediately upon filing them 
with the court; (3) on the filing of the 
plans with the court, the Secretary im-
mediately direct county election officials 
to begin encoding the Masters' recom-
mended plans into their computer files; 
( 4) the Secretary direct county election 
officials to postpone issuing petitions for 
gathering signatures in lieu of filing fees 
until the court files its opinion designat-
ing the proper district lines; ( 4) the court 
set January 28 as the deadline for filing 
its opinion; and (6) the Secretary direct 
county officials that the first day for cir-
culating in lieu petitions, for filing decla-
rations of intent for legislative office, 
and for filing declarations of candidacy 
and nomination papers for legislative and 
congressional seats is February I 0. 
On December 2. the Special Masters 
released their recommended redistrict-
ing plans, which were widely viewed as 
favorable to Republicans, while also in-
creasing the chances of minority repre-
sentation in the legislature and Congress. 
The court accepted written comments on 
the recommendations until January 13, 
when it was scheduled to conduct a hear-
ing on the matter. 
Rider v. County of San Diego, 
_Cal. 3d_, 91 D.A.R. 15689, 
No. S0l7917 (Dec. 19, 1991). 
Sales Tax for Justice Facilities 
Is l111'Gltd U11der Propositio11 13 
The California Supreme Court has 
struck down a tax imposed on sales oc-
curring in San Diego County for the pur-
pose of financing the construction and 
operation of criminal detention and/or 
courthouse facilities for the County, find-
ing that the tax is invalid because it was 
not approved by at least two-thirds of the 
County's voters, as required by article 
XIII, section 4 of the California constitu-
tion (added by Proposition 13, a 1978 
initiative measure), which requires a 
LITIGATION 
supermajority vote with respect to any 
"special taxes" sought to be imposed by 
"cities, counties and special districts." 
In 1987, the legislature enacted the 
San Diego County Regional Justice Fa-
cility Financing Agency, and directed the 
Agency to adopt a tax ordinance impos-
ing a supplemental sales tax of 0.05% 
throughout the County for the purpose of 
financing the construction of justice fa-
cilities. The legislation also provided for 
a countywide election held for the pur-
pose of approving the tax ordinance by 
simple majority vote, and specified that 
the Agency possesses no tax power other 
than the foregoing sales tax. At a June 
1988 election, the County's voters ap-
proved the tax ordinance by a bare ma-
jority vote (50.8% ); plaintiffs, a group of 
County taxpayers, filed the present suit 
to challenge the validity of the tax. 
The Supreme Court determined that 
the Agency must be deemed a "special 
district" under section 4, despite its lack 
of power to levy a tax on real property; 
the court noted that to hold otherwise 
would create a wide loophole in Proposi-
tion 13 by allowing cities and counties to 
arrange for the formation of local taxing 
districts to finance municipal functions 
without securing the requisite two-thirds 
·voter approval. Thus, the court held that 
the term "special district" includes any 
local taxing agency created to raise funds 
for city or county purposes to replace 
revenues lost by reason of the restric-
tions of Proposition 13. As a result, the 
court invalidated the Agency's tax levy 
on the basis that it failed to secure the 
requisite two-thirds voter approval. 
Whitman v. Superior Court, 
_Cal. 3d_, 91 D.A.R. I 5081, 
No. S018847 (Dec. 9, 1991). 
Testimo11y by Reader of Police Report 
Does Not Establish Probable Cause 
In this case, the California Supreme 
Court resolved various issues presented 
by the June 1990 adoption of an initia-
tive measure designated on the ballot as 
Proposition 11 S. the Crime Victims Jus-
tice Reform Act. Specifically, petitioner 
challenged the provisions of the measure 
that authorize the admission of hearsay 
evidence at preliminary hearings in crimi-
nal cases, and contested the sufficiency 
and competency of the evidence pre-
sented at his preliminary hearing. At 
petitioner's preliminary hearing on felony 
drunk driving charges, the People's only 
witness was Officer Bruce Alexander, 
who was not one of the arresting or in-
vestigating officers and who had no di-
rect. personal knowledge of petitioner's 
alleged offenses; Alexander first became 
aware of the investigating officer's re-
port, and of the case against petitioner, 
on the morning of the preliminary hear-
ing after the district attorney handed him 
a copy of the report. Over petitioner's 
objection, Alexander was allowed to re-
count to the magistrate various entries 
made in the report of the investigating 
officer, Officer Navin. Despite 
petitioner's objections and his argument 
that Alexander could not personally iden-
tify him as the suspect stopped by Navin, 
the magistrate held petitioner to answer 
on the counts charged. 
On appeal, the California Supreme 
Court agreed with petitioner that, as a 
matter of sound statutory interpretation, 
Alexander should not have been permit-
ted to relate the contents of Navin's in-
vestigative report because Alexander was 
not involved in the investigation of the 
case and had no personal knowledge of 
the circumstances under which Navin's 
report was prepared. "Proposition 11 S 
does not authorize a finding of probable 
cause based on the testimony of a 
noninvestigating officer or 'reader' 
merely reciting the police report of an 
investigating officer." The court opined 
that the probable intent of the framers of 
the measure was "to allow a properly 
qualified investigating officer to relate 
out-of-court statements by crime victims 
or witnesses, including other law enforce-
ment personnel, without requiring the 
victims' or witnesses' presence in court. 
The testifying officer, however, must not 
be a mere reader but must have sufficient 
knowledge of the crime or the circum-
stances under which the out-of-court 
statement was made so as to meaning-
fully assist the magistrate in assessing 
the reliability of the statement." This 
holding seemingly foreshadows the re-
versal of Montez v. Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County, 233 Cal. App. 3d 
91 7 ( 1991 ), in which the Second District 
Court of Appeal held that no applicable 
law indicates that only so-called "first 
level hearsay" is admissible at the pre-
liminary examination, and that the "vot-
ers did not approve an initiative ... which 
contains ... limitations on the use of 
[multiple level] hearsay"; the California 
Supreme Court granted Montez· petition 
for review in this proceeding on October 
23. (See CRLR Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 1991) 
pp. 217-18 for background information 
on the Montez case.) 
In Whitma11, however, the court re-
jected petitioner's claim that Proposition 
I I 5 's authorization of the use of hearsay 
during a preliminary hearing violates the 
federal confrontation clause, holding that 
the constitutional right of confrontation 
is basically a trial right. The court also 
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rejected petitioner's claim that Proposi-
tion 115 denies him due process by 
impliedly providing that only the pros-
ecution may introduce hearsay at the 
preliminary hearing. The court noted 
that defendants continue to enjoy the 
benefits of all preexisting hearsay ex-
ceptions, and that-theoretically-the 
new provision might be interpreted to 
permit the defendant to call a law en-
forcement officer to relate statements 
which might rebut a finding of probable 
cause. Finally. the court rejected 
petitioner's claim that the new hearsay 
procedures violate the constitutional 
doctrine of separation of powers in that 
the prosecutor is given excessive power 
to control the quantity and quality of the 
evidence admitted at preliminary hear-
ings. The court noted that Proposition 
115 amended the state constitution to 
allow admission of hearsay evidence at 
preliminary hearings; because such pro-
cedure is specifically authorized by the 
constitution, the general separation of 
powers doctrine does not apply. The 
court also stated that no separation of 
powers violation exists. as the magis-
trate retains full authority and discre-
tion to rule on the sufficiency of the 
defendant's proof offer, to allow the 
admission of relevant defense evidence, 
and ultimately to determine whether the 
proffered evidence demonstrates prob-
able cause to hold the defendant to an-
swer for the charged offenses. 
CALIFORNIA COURTS 
OF APPEAL 
Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
_Cal. App. 3d_, 
91 D.A.R. 13951. 
No. A049948 (Nov. 12, 1991). 
Fee Award is Appropriate 
In Consumer Protection Action 
The First District Court of Appeal 
has upheld a judgment requiring Wells 
Fargo Bank to pay plaintiffs their attor-
ney fees, costs, and expenses in the total 
sum of almost $2 million, based on 
California's "private attorney general" 
statute (Civil Procedure Code section 
I 021.5). The underlying action involved 
a class action which challenged Wells 
Fargo Bank's assessment offees against 
credit card customers who failed to make 
timely payments or exceeded their credit 
limits; in a companion case, the First 
District affirmed a $5 million judgment 
in favor of the class. 
Section 1021.5 permits a fee award 
when the following criteria are met: (I) 
the action has resulted in the enforce-
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ment of an important right affecting the 
public interest; (2) a significant benefit 
has been conferred on the general pub-
lic or a large class of persons; (3) the 
necessity and financial burden of pri-
vate enforcement are such as to make 
the award appropriate: and (4) the fees 
should not in the interest of justice be 
paid out of the recovery, if any. 
Initially. the court determined that if 
the estimated value of a class action 
common fund recovery. determined as 
of the time the vital litigation decisions 
were being made, does not exceed ac-
tual litigation costs by a substantial mar-
gin, the financial burden of private en-
forcement is such as to make it 
appropriate to award attorneys' fees 
under section I 021.5. After reviewing 
the relevant figures, the court found it 
to be "a close issue" whether estimated 
value exceeds by a substantial margin 
the actual litigation costs. However, the 
court stated that "even if the estimated 
value of this case is viewed as exceed-
ing actual litigation costs by a substan-
tial margin, the public benefits from 
the litigation are so significant that an 
award of fees under section I 021.5 is 
appropriate." 
The court also concluded that the 
trial court's decision to apply a 1.5 lode-
star multiplier to the award of attor-
neys' fees was appropriate, noting that 
the $5 million award in the underlying 
action was an "excellent result" given 
the complexity of the case and the dis-
parity in resources available to the op-
posing parties. (See supra agency re-
port on STATE BANKING DEPART-
MENT for more information.) 
City of Gilroy v. State Board 
of Equalization, 
_Cal. App. 3d_, 
91 D.A.R. 13079, 
No. A052792 (Oct. 22, 1991). 
City's Tax Suit Entitles It 
to Recover Attorneys' Fees 
Under Equity Principles 
In this case, the First District Court 
of Appeal considered the first impres-
sion issue whether a public entity may 
recover attorneys' fees under the equi-
table common fund and substantial ben-
efit doctrines, despite the fact that the 
codified private attorney general theory 
(Code of Civil Procedure section I 021.5) 
prohibits allowances in favor of public 
entities. The underlying lawsuit was 
prosecuted by the City of Gilroy against 
the State Board of Equalization (Board) 
and Scientific Games, a vendor of the 
California State Lottery Commission 
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(CSL), regarding whether Scientific 
Games' sale of printed tickets to CSL is 
exempt from taxation under the Lottery 
Act. In 1989, the First District deter-
mined that, contrary to the position taken 
by the Board, Scientific Games' sales 
of printed tickets to CSL are not exempt 
from state or local taxation. City of 
Gilrov v. State Board of Equalization, 
212 Cal. App. 3d 589 ( 1989). Arguing 
that its successful litigation of that mat-
ter created a new fund of tax revenues 
for the state, Gilroy petitioned the court 
for an award of attorneys' fees under 
the common fund and substantial ben-
efit doctrines. Although no relief was 
sought under section I 021.5, the trial 
court determined that the statutory pro-
vision controlled, and forbade, an award 
of fees to Gilroy. 
On appeal, the First District Court of 
Appeal rejected the trial court's holding 
on three grounds. First, the court noted 
that Gilroy had sought fees under the 
equitable common fund and substantial 
benefit doctrines, not section 1021.5, 
and the trial court gave no reason why 
those theories were unavailable to 
Gilroy. Second, the First District deter-
mined that section I 021.5 precludes an 
award of attorneys' fees in favor of a 
public entity only when the award is 
made pursuant to its own provisions. 
Third, the First District concluded that 
section I 02 l .5 does not purport to gov-
ern fee awards made on any other basis. 
"Thus it cannot be construed as abro-
gating the common fund and substan-
tial benefit doctrines; these still remain 
viable predicates for fee awards under 
the appropriate circumstances." 
The court then considered whether 
the substantial benefit and common fund 
theories are viable options for awarding 
attorneys' fees to public entities. The 
court noted that the substantial benefit 
doctrine rests on the principles that those 
who have been unjustly enriched at 
another's expense should under some 
circumstances bear their fair share of 
the costs entailed in producing the ben-
efits they have obtained, and found that 
"because constituents of other public 
entities stood to benefit from Gilroy's 
efforts as a matter of course, it makes 
perfect sense under the common fund 
or substantial benefit theory to spread 
the cost of attorneys' fees among these 
entities." The court remanded the mat-
ter to the trial court to determine (I) the 
precise amount of the common fund of 
tax revenues generated by Gilroy's ef-
forts; and (2) the amount of reasonable 
attorneys' fees to be paid from this fund. 
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Benjamin v. County of Lake, 
235 Cal. App. 3d 1574, 
91 D.A.R. 14187, 
No.A051411 (Nov. 19, 1991). 
County Cannot Be Held Liable 
in Tort for Failing to Provide 
Health Benefits to Indigents 
The First District Court of Appeal 
has detennined that a county cannot be 
held liable in tort for failing to provide 
health benefits to indigents as required 
by Welfare and Institutions Code sec-
tion 17000 et seq. In 1986 and 1987, 
appellants Matthew Benjamin and 
Charlie Wilkerson sought dental care 
from Lake County's medically indigent 
adult (MIA) clinics; both men were im-
properly denied dental treatment and 
subsequently prepared to file lawsuits 
against Lake County. Through its county 
counsel, Lake County became aware of 
the actions in February 1987; county 
counsel apparently contacted the appro-
priate persons who shortly thereafter 
authorized the desired treatment for both 
Benjamin and Wilkerson. Although both 
men received the care they needed, the 
delay in treatment caused their condi-
tions to worsen and caused them pain; 
they subsequently brought this action to 
seek damages for injury caused due to 
that delay. 
Government Code section 815 states 
the general rule that "[a] public entity is 
not liable for an injury, whether such 
injury arises out of an act or omission of 
the public entity or a public employee 
or any other person." An exception to 
a ru e is provided in Government 
Code section 815.6, which provides that 
"[ w]here a public entity is under a man-
datory duty imposed by an enactment 
that is designed to protect against the 
risk of a particular kind of injury, the 
public entity is liable for an injury of 
that kind proximately caused by its fail-
ure to discharge the duty unless the pub-
lic entity establishes that it exercised 
reasonable diligence to discharge the 
duty." This section provides a three-
pronged test for detennining whether 
liability may be imposed on a public 
entity: (I) an enactment must impose a 
mandatory, not discretionary, duty; (2) 
the enactment must intend to protect 
against the kind of risk of injury suf-
fered by the party asserting section 815 .6 
as a basis for liability; and (3) breach of 
the mandatory duty must be a proxi-
mate cause of the injury suffered. The 
court detennined that appellants failed 
to satisfy the first and second prongs of 
this test. 
LITIGATION 
Regarding the first prong, the court 
noted that Lake County is not a health 
care provider. While Welfare and Insti-
tutions Code section 17000 et seq. de-
fines the ultimate rights of patients, it 
"mandate[s] no specific acts by a 
county." Accordingly, "in order to meet 
the 'mandatory duty' prong of Govern-
ment Code section 815.6, Benjamin and 
Wilkerson would have to show that Lake 
County failed to comply with applicable 
statutory or regulatory mandate in adopt-
ing its own health care standards, and/ 
or in imposing those standards on the 
health care provider." While acknowl-
edging that Lake County has a manda-
tory duty to adopt standards which pro-
vide for humane care, the court 
detennined that "the discretion inherent 
in the process of developing and adopt-
ing these standards immunizes it from 
any claim for damages resulting from 
its actions." 
As to the second prong, the court 
stated that Government Code section 
815.6 authorizes governmental liability 
for negligence where there is a duty of 
care, negligence constituting a breach 
of the duty, and injury to the plaintiff as 
a proximate cause. The court rational-
ized that although Benjamin and 
Wilkerson are beneficiaries of the duty 
imposed by Welfare and Institutions 
Code section I 7000, "it does not follow 
that Lake County owed Benjamin and 
Wilkerson a duty of care under those 
sections." According to the court, 
"[ w ]hether or not a duty of care will be 
recognized depends upon a number of 
factors reflecting public policy issues." 
The court concluded that consideration 
of those factors "leaves little doubt but 
that no duty of care to M!As, such as 
Benjamin and Wilkerson, should be im-
plied into section 17000 et seq."' Thus, 
the court held that no cause of action for 
damages exists against Lake County 
under section I 7000. 
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